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THE CONTINUING GLOOM ABOUT FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING 
Richard D. Freer 
ABSTRACT—In 2013, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turn seventy-
five years old. The rulemaking process by which they are promulgated has 
been a source of gloom for a generation. Like a wayward Hollywood star, 
the process is in “crisis” and its fans are experiencing “malaise.” This 
Article addresses the reasons for that gloom and concludes that some level 
of crisis is inevitable. At the macro level, as Professor Redish has 
emphasized, judicial rulemaking is a legislative function being performed 
by an unelected body that is constitutionally empowered only to perform 
the task of deciding cases and controversies. At the micro level, the Rules 
Advisory Committee is subject to being second-guessed by Congress, is 
plagued by uncertainty about the statutory limits of its power under the 
Rules Enabling Act, and receives inconsistent signals from the Supreme 
Court concerning the desirability of rulemaking versus case law 
development. 
These forces impel the Advisory Committee to avoid clashes with 
Congress and the Supreme Court by attending to minor matters. Instead of 
leading, as it is institutionally constituted to do, the Committee has become 
focused on wordsmithing. The result is an unjustified barrage of trifling 
changes that burden the bench and bar and squander opportunities to 
address topics meaningful to the administration of justice. Ultimately, then, 
the gloom attending the federal judicial rulemaking process is largely the 
Committee’s fault. Like the wayward star, it should change, a process that 
starts by understanding the burdens and costs imposed by every procedural 
change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) turn seventy-
five years old. Though the Rules themselves have earned their encomia, the 
process by which they are promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act 
(REA)1 has been a source of gloom for more than a generation. Reading 
law review commentary about federal rulemaking is like reading tabloid 
headlines about a wayward Hollywood star. The favorite word, dating from 
1975,2 is “crisis.”3 Like the troubled star, the civil rulemaking process has 
engaged in “irresponsible experiment”4 and occasionally manifests a lack 
of real-world grounding.5 Its fans suffer “malaise”6 because the process is 
 
1 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
2 See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (1975). 
3 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 652–53 (2010); Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 
299 (2008) (“[C]risis clamor seems fairly universal among academics . . . .”); Cheryl L. Haas, Note, 
Judicial Rulemaking: Criticisms and Cures for a System in Crisis, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 149 (1995). 
4 Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 844 (1993). Specifically, Professor Burbank decried what he saw as an 
“irresponsible experiment with court access” by the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Id. 
5 Professor Burbank called for a moratorium on civil rulemaking until the Advisory Committee 
made provision for sufficient empirical data on which to base rule amendments. Id. at 841–42; see also 
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 75–85 (1988). 
6 Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 7 (1994). 
In that article, Professor Wright said he “was gloomier about the status of the rulemaking process than I 
had ever been.” Id. at 9. 
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“in disarray, if not in decline.”7 It has lost its influence as a role model,8 is 
“under siege,”9 and might “go the way of the French aristocracy.”10 
People are gloomy for different reasons. To some, the problem is that 
the Supreme Court engages in amendment by case law instead of through 
the REA process.11 Others cite the “politicization” of the process a 
generation ago, which took rulemaking out of the hands of elite experts.12 
Others believe the process does not take into account the sea change in the 
nature of litigation from a system based upon adjudication to one based 
upon settlement.13 Whatever the reasons, the sense of unease is palpable. 
Even defenders are not enthusiastic. About the best one finds, reflected in 
the title of an article by Professor Marcus, is that the federal rulemaking 
process is “Not Dead Yet.”14 
In my view, the problem is that the process, in the hands of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Committee),15 is all too alive. In the 
past two decades, the Committee has imposed too much new material to be 
processed meaningfully or assimilated smoothly. Moreover, that period has 
brought a new phenomenon: amendments that do nothing but wordsmith.16 
So I am gloomy because a Committee well suited to lead and innovate on 
things that matter—as it did with electronic discovery—leads infrequently 
and seems to see itself as a platonic arbiter of style. It has lost the 
 
7 Carl Tobias, Opt-Outs at the Outlaw Inn: A Report from Montana, 14 REV. LITIG. 207, 212 
(1994). 
8 Specifically, as a role model for state procedural provisions. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New 
Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a 
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1184–88 (2005). 
9 Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1999). 
10 Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991). 
11 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3. 
12 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169, 1241 (1996) (noting that the REA 
“envisioned procedural rulemaking as an essentially technical undertaking best left in the expert hands 
of judges”); Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (“The reigning sensibility for fifty years of federal 
rulemaking has been an ethos of elitism and secrecy; of closeted, deliberative efforts by a committee of 
experts.”). 
13 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 319, 334–37 (2008). 
14 Marcus, supra note 3. 
15 I limit my discussion to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
16 In his transmittal letter to the Chief Justice, the Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference said that the 2006 amendments to the Rules were intended to 
“clarify, simplify, and modernize their expression without changing their substantive meaning.” 
Memorandum from Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the U.S., to the Honorable John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the U.S. 3 (Nov.  
1, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1106/summary_
proposed_amend.pdf. 
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opportunity, for example, to lead on the appropriate standard for pleading a 
claim. Worse yet, I believe, the Committee’s hyperactive fiddling has done 
harm by imposing untoward burdens on bench and bar and expenses on 
litigants. 
In this Article, I discuss some possible explanations for this gloomy 
state. The discussion must recognize that “judicial rulemaking” engages 
two levels of delegation: at the macro level, in the REA, Congress 
delegates legislative power to the judiciary; at the micro level, the Supreme 
Court delegates its power to the Committee. Each level raises its own 
problems. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. First, at the macro level, the entire 
enterprise under the REA is rife with tension concerning the roles of the 
legislative and judicial branches. As Professor Redish has argued, once we 
recognize that procedural rules affect the enforcement of substantive rights, 
the lodging of a legislative function in the Judicial Branch raises a potential 
constitutional question. So even if the Court itself actually discharged the 
role of drafting proposed Rules, we should expect nervousness, if not 
“crisis.” Second, at the micro level, the Committee (as delegee of a 
delegee) faces at least four significant “pressure points” that render its job 
especially difficult. Specifically, it must deal with (1) lack of clarity 
regarding the validity of Rules under the REA, (2) congressional 
intermeddling, (3) politicization of the rulemaking process, and 
(4) inconsistent signals from the Supreme Court. In the aggregate, these 
pressure points may explain the Committee’s recent general reluctance to 
tackle major issues and its retreat to stylistic tinkering. Third, I review 
some of the Committee’s specific efforts in the past generation, which 
show that the Committee too often plays from behind and engages in trivial 
efforts that unduly burden the profession the Committee is supposed to 
serve. 
I. THE MACRO LEVEL: THE INHERENT “CRISIS” IN FEDERAL  
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING 
In the REA, Congress permits the Supreme Court to promulgate rules 
of procedure for the federal courts. It delegates to the Judicial Branch a 
legislative function.17 The process is inherently antidemocratic because the 
people responsible for this legislative product are not elected.18 It is also 
 
17 Everyone seems to agree with this point, but as my friend Tom Arthur asks, why is it up to 
Congress to tell the Judicial Branch how to run its business? After all, no one has ever suggested that 
the Court has the authority to write the Senate Rules. Still, the Legislature has assumed a role in setting 
federal court procedure at least since the Conformity Act. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 
196, 197. That legislation instructed federal courts to employ the procedural law of the state in which 
they sat. 
18 See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the 
Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 
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inherently awkward because the Constitution authorizes the people 
ostensibly performing the task19 to decide cases and controversies, and not 
to draft legislation.20 
The process caused few sleepless nights in the early years. When 
Congress passed the REA in 1934, the prevailing jurisprudential sense 
seemed to be that “substance” and “procedure” were hermetically separated 
things.21 The drafters of the REA certainly understood that Congress could 
not delegate to the judiciary the power to define substantive rights. Because 
the REA delegated only the authority to prescribe “procedural” rules, the 
thinking was, Congress retained the power to legislate on federal 
“substantive” matters.22 The Court reflected this view in 1941 in Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co., which appeared to treat substance and procedure as mutually 
exclusive fields.23 
At some point, however, everyone recognized that there is no hermetic 
seal; procedural provisions routinely affect the enforcement of substantive 
rights.24 Thus, for instance, the compulsory counterclaim provision, Rule 
13(a),25 has a substantive impact by precluding the assertion of a claim that 
should have been filed in an earlier case. Pleading rules erect a barrier to 
entry that keeps some claims out of the litigation stream altogether. 
Discovery sanctions may result in the entry of default judgment against a 
defendant or dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim. Rule 23 permits aggregation 
of claims that may create opportunities for vindication of substantive rights 
that otherwise would not exist. By permitting interlocutory review of class 
action certification orders, Rule 23(f) affects the availability of the class 
 
1303–08 (2006); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) 
(reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977)); Mullenix, 
supra note 10, at 840–42. 
19 The REA imposes the task on the Supreme Court. Of course, the Justices do not perform the 
task, but have long delegated it to the Committee. 
20 “[T]he Rules Enabling Act invests in the Supreme Court lawmaking power untied to the judicial 
process.” Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1305; see id. at 1319–27 (discussing the 
constitutionality of the REA). 
21 Id. at 1311 (referring to the “widespread, albeit fallacious, assumption about the mutual 
exclusivity between matters of procedure and matters of substance”). 
22 At least after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938), left nonfederal substantive 
matters to the states. 
23 312 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1941); see infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text. 
24 “No one today could seriously doubt that procedural rulemaking involves the weighing of 
substantial policy interests and dynamically alters the development of the substantive law.” Redish & 
Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1319; see also infra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. This point should 
have been clear when the Court decided Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 
525 (1958), although the case did not address the validity of a Federal Rule, and certainly by the time 
the Court upheld Rule 4 in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965). 
25 All references in this paper to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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device in federal court.26 Indeed, as Justice Scalia recognized in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., “most 
[Federal] Rules have some effect on litigants’ substantive rights or their 
ability to obtain a remedy.”27 
With this realization, judicial rulemaking became considerably more 
problematic. Indeed, at that point, Professor Redish argues, the REA 
process became not just awkward, but unconstitutional. Because Article III 
courts are politically insulated, the Constitution limits their lawmaking 
authority to the adjudicatory process; federal courts are permitted to make 
policy choices only in the context of resolving cases or controversies.28 
Because the REA vests courts with lawmaking power of a legislative 
variety and the judiciary is not responsible to the electorate, the REA, 
Redish concludes, “has undermined the essence of the democratic 
process.”29 
This theory is bold30 and raises an existential crisis for judicial 
rulemaking.31 But Professor Redish is not only admirably bold as a scholar; 
he is admirably pragmatic. He recognizes that there is little chance the 
Court will question the constitutionality of the REA.32 Indeed, in Shady 
Grove, the Court showed no willingness to address the sorts of issues he 
raised. So Professor Redish offers a strong fallback position: the Court 
should recognize that the interplay of procedure and substance requires it to 
put some teeth in the statutory analysis of whether Rules are valid.33 This 
statutory standard—specifically, how to interpret § 2072(a) and (b)—
 
26 Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions: A Preliminary 
Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 19 (2007) (finding that 52% 
of cases in which courts of appeals undertook appellate review resulted in reversals of certification 
orders). 
27 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445 n.10 (2010). 
28 Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1305. Professor Redish recognizes that federal courts have 
the authority to undertake tasks beyond adjudication. What he calls “paradigm two” activities—hiring 
law clerks, holding conferences, and the like—“have no readily discernible impact on the lives of 
citizens beyond the four walls of the courthouse.” Id. at 1324. On the other hand, “paradigm one” 
activities consist of the judiciary’s authorized lawmaking function, which must be discharged through 
the decision of cases or controversies. Id. 
29 Id. at 1335. 
30 Redish himself characterized the argument as “unthinkable.” Id. at 1334. 
31 One way to fix the problem would be to have the Committee report to Congress, which would 
then draft the Rules. Id. at 1326 (suggesting that finding the process unconstitutional “would mean, 
simply, that the Rules (at least those not of the housekeeping variety) would ultimately have to come 
from Congress and be signed by the President. Presumably, the Advisory Committee could still make 
recommendations, but to Congress, rather than to the Court.”). 
32 Id. at 1331 (“To be sure, legitimate or not, the holding of the Act’s constitutionality is not likely 
to change in the foreseeable future.”). 
33 Id. at 1332 (“It is conceivable, however, that a parallel subconstitutional concern about the need 
for accountable policy makers should guide construction of the cryptic substance-procedure distinction 
imposed by the Act itself.”). 
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ultimately must guide the group that actually drafts the Rules. That group, 
of course, is the Committee. We turn now to challenges it faces in doing so. 
II. THE MICRO LEVEL: THE COMMITTEE FACES SIGNIFICANT  
PRESSURE POINTS 
In this Part, I address four things that make the Committee’s job 
especially challenging and may, as a whole, cause it to shrink from 
boldness. The first of these is the point just noted: that the ultimate standard 
for determining whether a Rule is valid under the REA is unclear. Indeed, it 
is not even clear who is in charge of determining whether the standard is 
met. In addition, the Committee’s job is made more difficult by the 
possibility of congressional interference, by a process that has opened the 
Committee to the kind of political pressure one normally associates with a 
legislative body, and by inconsistent signals from the Court about the 
desirability of rulemaking versus case law development. 
A. Lack of Clarity for Validity Under the REA 
Federal Rules must pass muster under the Constitution and the REA. 
Constitutionally, the Court has imposed a minimal requirement for validity 
under Article III, augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Even a 
Rule that affects substantive rights is constitutional if it is “‘rationally 
capable of classification’ as procedure.”34 That’s not much of a test. The 
rules under scrutiny, after all, are Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Does the REA raise a higher hurdle? It sets forth two requirements. 
First, under § 2072(a), a Rule must deal with “practice and procedure” in 
the federal courts.35 Second, under § 2072(b), a Rule “shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”36 In Sibbach, the Court engaged 
in double conflation: it combined the two parts of the REA into one test 
and further equated it with the constitutional test. Rules 35 and 3737 were 
valid under the REA for the same reason they were valid under the 
Constitution: they “really regulate[] procedure,—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress.”38 
The Sibbach analysis is skewed. Putting to one side whether the 
constitutional and statutory tests should be coextensive, Sibbach asks only 
whether a Rule is procedural. It fails to address whether the Rule modifies 
 
34 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) 
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
36 Id. § 2072(b). 
37 Rule 35 permits the court to order a medical examination of a party as part of discovery. Rule 37 
provides methods for enforcing the discovery provisions of the Rules, including Rule 35. 
38 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
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a substantive right. In other words, it puts all the REA eggs in the § 2072(a) 
basket and gives no independent heft to § 2072(b).39 Professor Redish has 
shown that this “redundancy construction” of the REA is consistent with—
indeed, explained by—the notion that there is hermetic separation between 
substance and procedure.40 So at the time of Sibbach, to say that a Rule 
“really regulated procedure” was to say that it could not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right. By 1965, though, when it decided Hanna 
v. Plumer,41 the Court should have been willing to address the possibility (if 
not the likelihood) that § 2072(b) limits § 2072(a). Surprisingly, however, 
even at that late date it continued to embrace Sibbach and its conflation of 
§ 2072(a) and § 2072(b).42 
Later, however, in cases such as Burlington Northern Railroad v. 
Woods43 and Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications 
Enterprises, Inc.,44 the Court recognized that procedural provisions do 
affect the enforcement of substantive rights.45 It concluded that a Rule is 
valid so long as this impact on substantive rights is “incidental.”46 In 2008, 
Professor Redish adumbrated a cogent approach to the question of what 
this means.47 To assess whether an impact is “incidental,” Redish appealed 
to the underlying purposes of the REA: (1) to ensure that Congress remains 
responsible for substantive federal policy decisions and (2) to ensure a 
uniform system of procedure in federal courts.48 He reasoned that Rules 
may affect substantive rights in two ways. First, rulemakers may 
promulgate what they think is a purely procedural provision that, in 
practice, has a substantive “spillover” effect on substantive rights.49 
Second, and more importantly, rulemakers draft provisions that 
foreseeably—indeed, in many cases intentionally—affect substantive 
 
39 At the time Sibbach was decided, the two provisions did not carry those subsection designations. 
The operative language, however, was the same. See 28 U.S.C. § 723b (1940). 
40 Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive 
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (2008). 
41 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
42 Dean Ely noted that Sibbach recognized no independent role for § 2072(b). John Hart Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724–33 (1974). 
43 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
44 498 U.S. 533 (1991). 
45 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1107 (1982) (arguing that the Court was correct in not attributing independent significance to 
§ 2072(b)); Ely, supra note 42, at 718. 
46 “Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision 
[§ 2072(b)] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.” Burlington 
Northern, 480 U.S. at 5. 
47 Redish & Murashko, supra note 40. 
48 Id. at 55–57. 
49 Id. at 87–88. 
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rights. Such provisions are valid if the “impact on substantive rights is 
merely secondary to the primary procedural purpose.”50 
Redish explained, for example, that Rule 37’s provision for dismissal 
as a discovery sanction, which has an obvious and intended impact on 
plaintiffs’ substantive rights, is valid because it is aimed primarily at 
enforcing the discovery provisions of the Rules. Without such an 
“instrumental use[] of substantive consequences”—without such a 
“substantive club”—the discovery provisions “could not be assured of 
functionality.”51 
But “incidental” is not a synonym for “insignificant.” A Rule’s impact 
on substantive law may be profound and yet still incidental, as 
demonstrated by the example of dismissal as a discovery sanction.52 The 
question is whether the “substantive club” is needed to enforce a procedural 
goal. Further, in making this assessment, Redish concluded, the court 
should not look to the content of the affected state law. The issue is 
whether the federal provision is aimed at a procedural objective.53 
Unfortunately, the Court in Burlington Northern and Business Guides 
failed to engage in analysis of this sort. One reason, Redish points out, is its 
unfortunate establishment of a presumption that the Federal Rules are valid. 
As early as Hanna, the Court placed great importance on the fact that the 
Rules go through multiple layers of review.54 Amending a Rule requires 
seven steps and engages five bodies.55 In Burlington Northern, the Court 
concluded that this gauntlet lends the Rules “presumptive validity” because 
of the “study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory 
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory 
requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review 
before taking effect.”56 
This presumption is unjustified for at least two reasons. One, it is not 
clear that any group actually reviews the Rules for validity under the REA. 
More likely, each assumes that another does the heavy lifting.57 The 
Congress that passed the REA evidently assumed that the Supreme Court 
 
50 Id. at 89. 
51 Id. at 90–91. 
52 Id. at 40–41, 80–84, 91–93. 
53 Id. at 92 (“All that matters is whether the rules affect substantive rights incidentally . . . .”). 
54 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
55 See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (explaining that a Rule proposal “undergoes at least 
seven stages of formal comment and review, in a process involving five separate institutions: the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress”). 
56 Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987). 
57 See Haas, supra note 3 (“In upholding the rule [in Hanna], the Court, rather than undertaking its 
own independent review, relied on the assumption that someone must have considered the rule’s 
validity.”). 
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would undertake this review.58 The Court’s assessment of the Rules, 
however, is desultory at best.59 Perhaps the Justices assume that the 
Committee or the Judicial Conference analyzes the provisions for validity 
under the REA. One gets the picture of a pop fly falling between the 
centerfielder, the shortstop, and the second baseman. 
And two, presumptive validity ignores the fact that Congress’s role 
here is reactive. When the Court sends a Federal Rule to Congress, it has 
changed the legal status quo. As Redish says: “Congress must overcome 
the serious (and intended) inertia against legislative action to alter or 
supplant the Rules’ dictates.”60 In other words, if Congress does nothing, it 
does something. For this reason, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sibbach, 
concluded that “to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by 
Congress is to appeal to unreality.”61 
The Court had the benefit of Redish’s analysis when it decided Shady 
Grove in 2010. In that case, state law forbade class litigation of the 
substantive claim being asserted. The question was whether a federal court 
exercising diversity jurisdiction could nonetheless permit such claims to be 
asserted by a class. The Court held that Rule 23 governed and permitted the 
class, and that the provision is valid under the REA. It did so, however, in 
two opinions: the plurality of four by Justice Scalia and the concurrence of 
Justice Stevens. These opinions differed on the test for validity of a Rule 
under the REA and thus left the standard in doubt.62 
Though not citing the Redish article, there is much in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion that is consistent with the Redish approach. Thus, a Rule is valid if 
its effect on substance is “incidental,” and the court looks only to the 
federal provision (not state law) in making this determination.63 Justice 
Scalia did not appear to rely on the presumptive validity of the Rules. And, 
 
58 Burbank, supra note 45, at 1137 (“[H]aving failed to address the problem at all systematically, 
the [Advisory] Committee was forced, and in most cases was quite content, to rely largely on judgments 
informed by a sense of the professional and political climate and by the hope that the Supreme Court 
would preserve it from error.”). Professor Burbank also concluded that the original Reporter to the 
Committee “was more committed to the integrity of the Rules than he was to the Act’s limitations.” Id. 
at 1136. 
59 See Haas, supra note 3, at 146 (“[T]he Justices, by their own admission, heavily rely upon the 
advisory committee’s suggestions.”). 
60 Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1326. 
61 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
62 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). The plurality, 
as will be seen, adopted Sibbach. Justice Stevens embraced a more searching inquiry that would give 
greater importance to § 2072(b). The four dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, based their 
reasoning on Erie and thus did not address the validity of Rule 23 under the REA. See id. at 1460–61 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 1443–44 (plurality opinion). For Justice Stevens, assessment of validity under the REA 
requires consideration of the state law itself. In this regard, he undertook a functional analysis and 
concluded that the New York law did not implicate substantive interests. Thus, it would be trumped by 
Rule 23. Id. at 1450–60 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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notably, he forthrightly recognized that procedure can affect substance: 
“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most 
procedural rules do.”64 This recognition should undercut Sibbach, which, as 
we saw, was rooted in the view that substance and procedure are mutually 
exclusive. Once Justice Scalia admitted that the two overlap, it would seem 
impossible for him to limit his assessment to the question of whether Rule 
23 “really regulates procedure.” Indeed, Scalia seemed willing to go there. 
He had addressed the distinction between § 2072(a) and § 2072(b), and 
even admitted that there is tension between Sibbach and § 2072(b): “[I]t is 
hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule 
‘abridges’ or ‘modifies’ substantive rights without knowing what state-
created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.”65 
Just as he was poised to engage in a meaningful analysis of whether 
Rule 23 modified state law, however, Justice Scalia pulled back. To him, 
Sibbach provides the sole test for validity of a Rule—under both § 2072(a) 
and § 2072(b). Rule 23 concerns the aggregation of claims. It thus “really 
regulates procedure” and, to Justice Scalia, is valid.66 So we are back where 
we were: the test for validity of a Rule is merely whether the provision is 
arguably procedural. The conclusion is jarring.67 
As a policy matter, Justice Scalia defended the result because it 
ensures that class action procedure will be uniform in every federal district. 
If the REA required the federal court to refuse to follow a Federal Rule 
when it conflicted with a law the state considered “substantive,” federal 
practice would be inconsistent from district courts in one state to district 
courts in another.68 
No doubt this is true, and Congress did intend that practice be uniform 
among the federal courts. But, that is only one policy basis for the REA. In 
addition, the Act seeks to ensure that the elected branch is responsible for 
making significant policy decisions.69 In Shady Grove, the defendant 
argued that permitting a class action in federal court for claims that could 
only be asserted individually in state court transformed the dispute from 
 
64 Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1443 (“Each of these rules had some practical 
effect on the parties’ rights . . . .”); id. at 1445 n.10 (“[M]ost Rules have some effect on litigants’ 
substantive rights or their ability to obtain a remedy, but that does not mean the Rule itself regulates 
those rights or remedies.”). 
65 Id. at 1445–46. 
66 Id. 
67 What Professor Redish said years before Shady Grove proved prescient: “It is as if the Court, by 
relying on Sibbach, first validates the [REA] by implicitly invoking that decision’s faulty premise of 
procedural-substantive mutual exclusivity . . . and, having thus found the Act constitutional, readily 
acknowledges the faultiness of this essential premise.” Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1331 
(footnotes omitted). 
68 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 (noting “the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary 
from State to State would be chaos”). 
69 Redish & Murashko, supra note 40, at 55–56. 
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one concerning $500 to one concerning $5,000,000. The Court’s holding in 
Shady Grove created litigation (and the risk of substantive liability) that 
state law would not have permitted. Even if one ultimately concludes that 
the impact of the federal provision is “incidental,”70 the question of whether 
the result modifies a substantive right deserved the sort of hearing it gets in 
Redish’s compelling book Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy 
and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit.71 The rote incantation of the 
Sibbach test failed to give the argument its due. 
For present purposes, it is enough to note two things about the state of 
the law concerning validity of a Rule under the REA. First, because neither 
the Court nor Congress undertakes a meaningful assessment of whether a 
Rule is valid under the REA, it may be incumbent on the Committee to do 
so. Second, doing so is difficult because the Court has failed to prescribe a 
test beyond the “really regulates procedure” shibboleth of Sibbach. On the 
one hand, the lack of a meaningful standard for judicial review might 
counsel the Committee to be as bold as possible in promulgating new 
Rules. But there are other pressure points that seem to push in the opposite 
direction. 
B. Congressional Action 
Despite its general delegation of procedural rulemaking to the 
Supreme Court, Congress continues to prescribe civil procedure. It does so 
sporadically and unpredictably as the result of lobbying, and its work 
product is rarely admirable. 
Sometimes Congress affects procedure as part of substantive 
legislation. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
imposed strict pleading requirements, detailed provisions for the 
appointment of lead plaintiff and counsel, and rules for overseeing 
settlements in securities class actions.72 Such efforts complicate matters for 
lawyers and judges, who must abide by statutory and Federal Rules 
provisions. They are also antithetical to the goal of procedural consistency 
across substantive areas.73 
 
70 130 S. Ct. at 1443. 
71 MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). The existence of the class action makes possible (if not likely) 
the assertion of claims that would never have been brought otherwise. The fact that negative-value 
consumer claims would not be brought individually is consistent with the maxim de minimis non curat 
lex. The fact that such claims actually are asserted in class actions trumps that maxim. 
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006). 
73 The Federal Rules are grounded on the notion that they apply equally to all cases; there are no 
specialized rules for certain types of cases. Congress’s intervention in specific substantive areas 
challenges that principle. See Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (noting that interest group demands for 
substance-specific procedural rules threaten the goal of transsubstantivity). 
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Sometimes Congress changes procedure in legislation that is primarily 
jurisdictional. The best example is the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).74 
Though intended principally to funnel multistate class actions into federal 
court, CAFA imposes several procedural requirements concerning 
appointment of class counsel and awards of attorney’s fees. Though CAFA 
is transsubstantive in that it applies potentially to any claim, it creates a 
confusing second layer of procedural rules for bench and bar. 
Occasionally, Congress intervenes directly with Rules as forwarded 
from the Court. The watershed here concerned not the Civil Rules, but the 
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972. Congress rejected the 
proposals, took over the project, and wrote the Rules. To many, that 
signaled a turning point in the relationship between the two branches and 
the Court’s “monopoly” on promulgation of procedure.75 
It also reflected the problems associated with permitting lobbying 
regarding procedural rules. In 1988, Congress unilaterally revised Rule 35, 
which permits court orders of medical examinations as part of discovery, to 
include examinations by psychotherapists.76 It did so, apparently, because a 
Senator’s daughter was a psychotherapist, and the Senator pushed the 
amendment.77 Similarly, in 1983, Congress scuttled a proposed version of 
Rule 4, which would have permitted service of process by certified mail. It 
did so in response to lobbying by professional process servers.78 
Occasionally, Congress has also attempted to change provisions already 
promulgated, such as a 1993 effort in the House of Representatives to make 
sanctions mandatory under Rule 11.79 
The sense that Congress might be looking over its shoulder may 
influence the Committee to eschew significant revisions. In addition, the 
sort of lobbying we expect to see at Congress is now part of the process at 
the Committee level as well because of the transformation of the 
rulemaking process from one behind closed doors to an open one. 
 
74 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). 
75 Geyh, supra note 12, at 1227; see id. at 1169 (“In rulemaking . . . the past twenty-five years have 
witnessed a startling transformation of the judiciary’s role.”). 
76 See Carrington, supra note 3, at 623 (“Congress again joined in (or intruded into) our enterprise 
in 1988 by quietly enacting . . . a revision of Rule 35 authorizing mental examinations of parties by 
psychologists as well as psychiatrists.”). 
77 Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 
39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 287 n.176 (2009). 
78 Bone, supra note 9, at 902–03; Mullenix, supra note 10, at 844–46. 
79 Redish & Amuluru, supra note 18, at 1317. Sometimes Congress appears to resent the 
Committee. “[S]ome in Congress seem anxious to rub the rulemakers’ noses in the fact of their position 
of inferiority. For example, even as Rule 23(f) was headed toward implementation in 1998, bills before 
Congress sought to provide virtually the same thing. And some associated with congressional activity 
have bridled at awaiting or paying obeisance to the rulemaking process.” Richard L. Marcus, Reform 
Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 929 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
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C. The Change to an Open Process 
For the first fifty years of federal rulemaking, the Committee worked 
out of the public eye. The early Committees consisted of academics and 
lawyers, without judges. Meetings were closed, and comments were made 
available only to those who could show a reason for access. Committees 
did not publish their proceedings or drafts. By the late 1970s, membership 
of the Committee had changed, and the process had become dominated by 
judges.80 In 1983, the Standing Committee, reacting to the rejection of the 
Evidence Rules, published what it called its “evolved practice,” which 
included public hearings and publication of transcripts.81 
Congress insisted on more and imposed it in the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988.82 That Act requires 
public hearings, notice, an extended public comment period, and minutes 
recording what was considered, including negative public commentary. 
The result looks a good deal like agency rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.83 It changed the rulemaking process 
fundamentally from one in the hands of a cadre of experts to a participatory 
model.84 The most worrisome aspect of this “politicization” was opening 
the Committee to lobbying. Unlike legislative lobbying, however—in 
which interest groups have electoral leverage over the targets of their 
efforts—members of the Committee are not running for office and need not 
pander for votes. Most members are Article III judges or the only group 
with a comparable form of tenure: university professors. 
Notwithstanding, there is a risk that interest groups unable to persuade 
the Committee will take their fight to Congress.85 This possibility may 
cause the Committee to shy away from big issues. Judge Weinstein 
cautioned that the Committee’s pushing too closely to the substantive side 
of things would lead Congress to take over and thereby “threaten[] the 
entire enterprise.”86 One former Reporter concluded that the Committee 
should “listen and count the decibels,” meaning that it should not act 
whenever potential revision raises substantial pushback.87 Such skittishness 
 
80 Carrington, supra note 3, at 609. 
81 Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 455, 468 (1993) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1983)). 
82 Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). 
83 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
84 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 165–
66 (1991); Mullenix, supra note 10, at 799–800 (“[W]hat previously had gone on behind closed doors is 
now open to enhanced public participation and scrutiny . . . .”). 
85 This happened with the 1983 amendments to Rule 4. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
86 Marcus, supra note 79, at 930. 
87 The then-Reporter urged that the Committee undertake only “sufficiently technocratic and 
apolitical” amendments. Memorandum from Reporter to Civil Rules Comm. 14 (Oct. 18, 1989); see 
Mullenix, supra note 10, at 836. 
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might embolden interest groups to raise a ruckus simply to get the 
Committee to forego potential changes.88 
One problem with the “decibel” test is that it equates popular reaction 
with important. Professor Marcus notes that several proposed amendments 
have created considerable outcry while ultimately not proving to be 
significant.89 More critically, the decibel test runs the risk of equating topics 
that evoke substantial reaction with substantive. The fact that the 
Committee must avoid substantive rulemaking does not mean that it should 
shy away from important rulemaking. 
Professor Carrington, who served as Reporter during implementation 
of the politicized process, records that the Committee was aware that 
“lobbying by the self-interested” had converted the Field Code, celebrated 
for its succinctness, to the bloated Throop Code of the 1880s.90 Despite this 
awareness and efforts to avoid the problem, the work product of the 
Committee has come to look more like a legislative product. Rules have 
gotten longer and more complex, and Committee notes look increasingly 
like legislative history.91 Because it acts in the shadow of Congress—under 
the threat that those it disappoints can go to the Capitol—the Committee 
may have an incentive to stay away from topics that will push too many hot 
buttons. Moreover, because that decisionmaking is now spread more 
broadly, it may be more difficult to forge agreement regarding how to react 
to Supreme Court decisions. 
D. Supreme Court Action 
Some criticize the Court for changing procedure by case law and not 
through the rulemaking process.92 Though we may agree that rulemaking is 
best done holistically, it is difficult to fault the Court for deciding cases. 
That is its day job. When the Court decides a case affecting the application 
of a Rule, the big question is how the Committee should react. The answer 
reflects the political nature of the task because it will depend in some 
measure on what one thinks of the Court’s decision as a normative matter. 
We might expect that today’s more democratic, widespread process will be 
less effective at forging a normative response than would a cadre of 
experts. 
 
88 See Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837. 
89 Marcus, supra note 79, at 935. 
90 Carrington, supra note 3, at 616. 
91 See Wright, supra note 6, at 5 n.18 (“One of the most pernicious developments in all federal 
rulemaking has been the change in Advisory Committee Notes. Instead of a brief indication of the 
source of a rule, as they were in the beginning, they have grown to be lengthy treatises on the subject 
dealt with by the particular rule.”). 
92 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3, at 621. 
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Occasionally the Committee acts to “reverse” a holding. It did this 
after the 1986 decision in Schiavone v. Fortune,93 in which the Court 
interpreted Rule 15 to deny relation back of an amended pleading. The 
result—that the plaintiff’s claim was barred—struck the then-Reporter as 
antithetical to the goal of Rule 15, which is to allow relation back when the 
party being added had timely notice.94 The Committee proposed an 
amendment, which took effect in 1991.95 
The same Reporter had a negative reaction to the Court’s 1986 trilogy 
of summary judgment decisions.96 In his view, the cases permitted courts to 
grant summary judgment “more freely than the text of the rule could 
reasonably be said to intend.”97 This time, he was unable to persuade the 
Committee to undo case law. Instead, the Committee opted to “codify” the 
trilogy in an amended Rule 56. The Standing Committee rejected the effort. 
The Reporter concluded that the Standing Committee did not want to 
“trespass on a lawmaking role that the high Court had appropriated for 
itself.”98 But there was another very good reason to reject the attempted 
codification. As Professor Wright explained: There is no profit in amending 
a Rule to restate (even in more elegant language) what it already is 
understood to say.99 
Scott v. Harris100 raises a similar issue. There, the Court held that a 
videotape rendered one party’s version of the facts so improbable that the 
court should have ignored that party’s affidavits in ruling on summary 
judgment.101 Some observers believe that the case altered proper practice 
 
93 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
94 See Carrington, supra note 3, at 619–20. The Committee also considered the holding antithetical 
to the command of Rule 1, to achieve “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Though these matters seemed clear in hindsight, the Rule as promulgated was 
susceptible to the interpretation in Schiavone. 
95 Carrington, supra note 3, at 620 & n.100. One wonders whether the same sorts of sentiment 
might lead the Committee on Appellate Rules to undo the holding in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 
208–13 (2007), to the effect that the time for appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be extended, even when 
the defendant is not prejudiced. 
96 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
97 Carrington, supra note 3, at 645. 
98 Id. at 647. 
99 “The draft was an elegant one. It reflected keen insight and great drafting skill . . . . But at a time 
when Rule 56 was working well, when three Supreme Court decisions had imposed an authoritative 
gloss on its meaning and application, it would have been a mistake to substitute a completely new rule.” 
Wright, supra note 6, at 5 (footnote omitted). Similarly, “[t]here is much to be said for sticking with a 
rule that three decades of experience and precedent have made workable rather than throwing away all 
the painfully accumulated learning by devising a new rule.” Id. 
100 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
101 Id. at 378–81. 
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for weighing of inferences under Rule 56.102 Others, however, see the case 
as an appropriate application of extant law.103 Should the Committee amend 
the Rule to abrogate the holding? Should the Committee amend the Rule to 
articulate the holding? When it amended Rule 56 in 2009 and 2010, it did 
neither. 
Indeed, usually the Committee does not react to case law. In 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,104 the Court upheld a district court’s inherent 
power to sanction lawyers and clients for abusive litigation conduct. Two 
years later, the Committee amended Rule 11 to restrict sanctions available 
under that provision. But the inherent power recognized in Chambers 
survives and opens a door for judges unhappy with the restrictions on Rule 
11 sanctions.105 The Committee has made no effort to blunt the impact of 
Chambers. 
The Court sends inconsistent signals about whether it prefers that 
issues be addressed by Rule amendment or by case law. Sometimes it 
eschews rulemaking. For example, when it decided Hickman v. Taylor,106 
the case that established federal work-product practice, the Court had 
before it a proposed rule dealing with the same subject. It decided the case 
and rejected the Rule.107 The Court did not promulgate Rule 26(b)(3) for 
more than two decades after deciding Hickman. 
Sometimes the Court lets things percolate in the lower courts, as it did 
with the development of mass tort class actions. The Committee notes to 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 indicated that group’s conclusion that the 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action would generally not be appropriate for such 
cases.108 Through the years, however, lower courts started to certify mass 
tort classes.109 The Court did not step in to stop the development. Scholarly 
 
102 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838–42 (2009) (expressing concern about the 
relative roles of judge and jury as fact finder). 
103 See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 6:5, at 27–28 (3d ed. Supp. 2011–2012). 
104 501 U.S. 32, 55–58 (1991). 
105 See Wright, supra note 6, at 4 (“Many federal judges do not like the restrictions the 1993 
amendments put on the power to impose Rule 11 sanctions.”); see also Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent 
Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal Judge Is Like an 800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REV. LITIG. 195 
(1994) (suggesting the use of inherent sanctions to overcome limitations imposed by Rule 11). 
106 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
107 See Richard L. Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives While 
Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 323, 329–31 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d 
ed. 2008). 
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
109 See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 325 
& n.9 (3d ed. 2005) (“[O]ther courts have ignored the Advisory Committee’s doubts and have allowed 
mass-disaster cases to be brought under subdivision (b)(3) . . . .” (citing cases from 1972 through 
1998)). 
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opinion on the issue changed.110 Eventually, the Court embraced the 
application of Rule 23(b)(3) in this context.111 
On other occasions, though, the Court seems to expect the Committee 
to act (or at least to think about an issue). One example may be 
Schiavone.112 A more interesting possibility, however, concerns pleading. 
For years, commentators and courts noted that liberal pleading standards 
may make it too easy to subject litigants to the costs of discovery. As 
discovery became more expensive, some observers suggested that pleading 
rules might be invigorated to raise the barrier to entry to the litigation 
stream. Some lower courts imposed heightened pleading requirements in 
some cases, particularly those asserting violations of civil rights. The Court 
rebuffed these efforts and seemed to invite the Committee to get involved. 
Twice within nine years—in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit113 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.114—it 
swatted back lower court efforts to raise the pleading bar. It said that any 
change in pleading standards “must be obtained by the process of amending 
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”115 
Yet, aside from ineffectual tinkering with the discoverability 
standard,116 the Committee did nothing. Five years after sending its second 
invitation to the Committee to consider pleading standards, the Court 
decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.117 It followed two years later with 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.118 These cases have generated a breathtaking amount of 
commentary, much of it urging the Committee to undo the holdings.119 
Professor Miller counsels Committee members to “determine whether they 
will reassert their role as independent architects of the Federal Rules, 
accept that an aspect of their responsibility now may be to codify the 
 
110 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 288 (“In the earlier 1960s we did not fully understand the implications of 
mass tort demands on our legal system.”). 
111 Though the Court rejected a certification class in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, it 
recognized that mass torts may be amenable to class treatment. 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“But the text 
of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and District Courts, 
since the late 1970’s, have been certifying such cases in increasing number.”). 
112 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
113 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
114 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
115 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
116 See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
117 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
118 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
119 “It would probably not be an overstatement to suggest that the combination of lower court 
confusion and intense scholarly controversy caused by two Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
Federal Rules over so short a time period is unprecedented.” Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, 
and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at 145, 
146. 
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Court’s Federal Rule decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case 
development.”120 
The Committee faces two questions in the wake of Twombly and 
Iqbal. First, should it do anything or simply leave the matter to the Court or 
Congress? Second, if it does something, should it change or embrace the 
holdings? The first question implicates the decibel test. Pleadings 
determine access to judicial machinery, which is obviously an issue of 
political importance. One is not surprised, therefore, to see that Congress 
has entertained the possibility of reacting to the cases. But one hopes it will 
not. Pleadings are but one part of the overall litigation process, to be 
balanced with others, such as discovery. Congress is ill suited to strike the 
balance meaningfully.121 One hopes that the Committee, which is well 
suited to contemplation and long-term consideration, will be the body (if 
any) that deals with the matter. 
The second question—what to do on the merits—has become more 
interesting with the passage of time. Had the Committee leapt in based 
upon early reaction to Twombly and Iqbal, it probably would have recast 
Rule 8 to abrogate the holdings. Initially, few people had anything good (or 
even neutral) to say about the decisions.122 Now, interestingly, scholarly 
opinion has evolved. Professor Redish makes a strong argument that 
Twombly and Iqbal are consistent with the notice pleading regime of Rule 
8(a)(2).123 Moreover, the Court has decided more pleading cases, including 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano124 and Skinner v. Switzer,125 which 
may indicate that the sky is not falling. Courts of appeals have had a chance 
to reverse improper dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).126 
 
120 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 87 (2010). 
121 After all, Congress delegated the job of prescribing procedure to the Court in the REA. 
122 See generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2010) 
(noting that Twombly and Iqbal have been “widely criticized as inconsistent with prior Supreme Court 
decisions, contrary to the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and having destructive policy 
consequences in terms of litigants’ access to the federal courts”). 
123 Redish, supra note 119, at 150–53; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, 
Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of 
Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1110 (2010) (“[L]ower courts could benefit 
from a framework for determining the plausibility of a complaint.”); Adam McDonell Moline, 
Comment, Nineteenth-Century-Principles for Twenty-First-Century Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 159 
(2010) (Twombly and Iqbal are “consistent with the commonsense principles that Field first articulated 
in 1847 and Clark reaffirmed in 1938”). 
124 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313–14 (2011) (unanimously affirming the reversal of a dismissal of a 
securities fraud case). 
125 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (reversing the affirmance of a dismissal on the pleadings). The 
Court emphasized that the relevant question is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but 
simply whether he may proceed in litigation. Id. at 1296. 
126 An empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center in 2011 suggests that there was no 
appreciable increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which cases are terminated by motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After 
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The prudent path now, the one the Committee is following, is to see 
whether a Rule amendment is required.127 The problem, of course, is that 
whatever the Committee does now will be reactive. It had its chance to 
lead—to respond to the Court’s invitation in Leatherman and 
Swierkiewicz—but, for whatever reason, did not do so. So now, with 
pleadings at least, the Committee must play from behind. 
We have seen that the Committee faces definite headwinds. Some of 
these may counsel it to refrain from tackling big issues. More than twenty 
years ago, Professor Mullenix predicted that the politicization of judicial 
rulemaking would channel that group’s efforts into noncontroversial, 
largely meaningless efforts.128 I believe she was right. Nothing can be more 
noncontroversial—more certain to keep Congress from second-guessing—
than tinkering with writing style. The contemporary Committee has spent 
too much time doing exactly that. 
III. THE COMMITTEE IN ACTION 
A. Positioned for Leadership 
Over the past two decades, the Committee has positioned itself well 
for deep consideration of major issues. I refer to two process innovations 
for which the Committee should be commended. The first relates to 
empirics. In the 1990s, Professor Burbank criticized the Committee for 
acting without empirical data and called for a moratorium on rulemaking 
until the Committee established a mechanism for empirical consideration.129 
In response, the process has changed with access to data from the Federal 
Judicial Center, the Case Management/Electronic Court Filing System, and 
other sources.130 Professor Marcus notes, for example, that such data 
manifested “considerable support” for mandatory initial disclosures, based 
upon experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.131 
The second innovation is the use of a consultative method to identify 
areas of potential Committee action. The Committee convenes conferences 
around the country to engage discussion on various topics. This sort of 
 
Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 12–16 (Mar. 2011), http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; see also Patricia W. 
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 
(2010). 
127 “The Committee agreed to keep pleading topics on the agenda for continuing active study and 
attention, but to continue to stay active development of specific proposals.” Civil Rules Advisory 
Comm., Minutes 32 ll. 1459–1461 (Nov. 7–8, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesand
Policies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2011-min.pdf. 
128 Mullenix, supra note 10, at 837 (“By evading responsibility, the Advisory Committee will 
become insignificant in the rulemaking process.”). 
129 See Burbank, supra note 4. 
130 Marcus, supra note 3, at 314. 
131 Marcus, supra note 79, at 920. 
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broad-based engagement ties in with the politicization of the rulemaking 
process. It is less top-down than the methods used in the old days. 
Innovations in case management, limitation of discovery, and initial 
disclosure all found their way into the Federal Rules because of percolation 
from local experience.132 And despite the politicization, one insider reports 
that the Committee hearings and conferences are “relatively apolitical”133 
and “probably come a good deal closer to a seminar than many hearings in 
Congress.”134 
In my opinion, the Committee’s signature triumph in the past decade is 
the 2006 project on electronic discovery.135 This effort was energized by 
these process improvements. It was at a consultative discussion on 
discovery generally that the Committee became aware of concern with 
electronic discovery.136 The effort also shows the advantage of taking the 
lead and not playing from behind. The Committee seized e-discovery, 
declared expressly that electronically stored information is discoverable, 
and gave salutary guidance on how discovery of such material should be 
handled.137 The effort may have averted disruptive decisions by some 
courts, bringing clarity to an area about which the bar was concerned. E-
discovery shows the Committee at its best. And, like efforts in the so-called 
Golden Age of rulemaking, this one has inspired action in the states.138 
But there have been too few examples of such leadership. For 
whatever reason, the Committee missed the chance to lead on pleadings. 
And though we will never again see reform as we did with the original 
Rules, which have been characterized as the “Big Bang,”139 there are plenty 
of big-ticket issues the Committee could address. One is Professor Redish’s 
fascinating argument that parties should not be required to pay the costs of 
 
132 Id. at 916, 925 n.131. 
133 Marcus, supra note 3, at 314. 
134 Marcus, supra note 79, at 933. 
135 Among other things, the 2006 effort amended Rule 34 expressly to recognize electronically 
stored information (ESI) as discoverable matter and to permit the parties to determine the form in which 
ESI would be produced. It also amended Rule 26(f) to require parties to discuss discovery of ESI in 
their planning conference, changed Rule 33(d) to recognize that ESI could be provided in lieu of 
interrogatory answers, and provided a safe harbor in Rule 37(f) for loss of information through the good 
faith, routine operation of an electronic information system. 
136 See Marcus, supra note 79, at 917–19. 
137 Some have argued that discovery of ESI could have been handled by extant rules, merely by 
recognizing ESI as a form of “document.” Documents have always been subject to discovery. See, e.g., 
Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different that It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. REV. 585 (2004). There is 
something to the argument. On the other hand, the Committee’s bold leadership left no doubt on the 
matter and provided meaningful guidance on how ESI should be treated in discovery. 
138 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2031.010–2031.510 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (Electronic 
Discovery Act). 
139 Marcus, supra note 3, at 300–01 (“We have all been brought up on the notion that the 
procedural Big Bang happened . . . with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
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complying with discovery requests.140 For the most part, though, the 
Committee has not pursued such topics. Instead of using its singular 
institutional advantages to think through big issues, the Committee has too 
often engaged in hyperactive tinkering. 
B. Much Ado About Little 
As an institution,141 the Committee has erred in two interrelated ways 
in the past two decades. First, it has imposed too much change. Second, too 
many of its amendments are busywork. Indeed, much of its recent activity 
is expressly aimed not at making procedure better, but at tinkering with 
terminology. The Committee seems unaware that its hyperactivity imposes 
significant burdens on the bench and bar and considerable expense on 
litigants. The Committee’s focus on the pedantic also raises the specter of 
lost opportunities. If the talent and effort invested in “restyling” each rule 
in 2007 had been brought to bear on standards for pleading,142 we might 
have averted Twombly and Iqbal. 
The Committee’s level of activity in recent years is startling. In the 
first fifty-seven years of the Rules, through 1994, the Committee 
promulgated eighteen sets of amendments. This averages one set every 
three years or so.143 This workload seems consistent with Judge Clark’s 
early sense that “the amending process will operate with comparative 
infrequency.”144 It gives lawyers, judges, and academics a chance to 
respond to proposals and to digest changes.145 In the sixteen years from 
1995 through 2010, in contrast, the Committee unleashed fifteen sets of 
amendments.146 Of course, not all sets of amendments are equally 
sweeping, but by any measure this is a remarkable amount of change for 
 
140 See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and 
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011). 
141 My criticism of the Committee is institutional, not personal. Committee members are an 
impressive lot, drawn from the top of the profession. 
142 See supra notes 117–26 and accompanying text. 
143 Amendments were promulgated in 1946, 1948, 1951, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1971, 
1972, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, and 1993. Historical Note, in FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE vii–xi (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/civil-procedure.
pdf. 
144 Charles E. Clark, “Clarifying” Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 242 
(1953). 
145 Ironically, this more leisurely pace of amendment applied when there was no provision for 
public review of proposed changes. Perhaps a public process leads the Committee to conclude that it 
can promulgate change more frequently. After all, the thinking might be, the profession will need less 
time to adjust to changes to which it has had access throughout the pipeline. 
146 Amendments were promulgated in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Historical Note, supra note 143, at xi–xii. 
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the profession to absorb. We need stability in the law, including procedural 
law.147 
Even if all of these amendments were salutary (and they were not), this 
level of activity runs the risk of fatiguing the intended audience. Lawyers 
and judges who might be willing—even pleased—to read drafts and 
comment on proposed changes every three or four years are less likely to 
go through detailed study year after year. I have no data, but the experience 
with the 2007 “restyling” project may be instructive. For that enormous 
task—the only time in which every rule was amended at the same time—
two of the three scheduled public hearings were cancelled for lack of 
interest.148 This fact might indicate widespread support for the project. On 
the other hand, it could demonstrate that a profession then numbed by 
eleven sets of amendments in twelve years had largely checked out. At 
least, the Committee should be sensitive to that possibility. 
Another example involves the Committee’s addressing the scope of 
discoverability under Rule 26(b)(1) in the late 1990s. The Committee 
reacted to widespread concern about the breadth and expense of 
discovery.149 This might have been a propitious time to consider the 
relationship between the pleading standard and discoverability, but the 
Committee did not undertake so broad a study. Effective in 2000, the 
Committee changed the discoverability standard from “relevant to the 
subject matter in the pending action” to “relevant to the claim or 
defense.”150 Not surprisingly, some lawyers and judges—at that point trying 
to assimilate six sets of Rules amendments in six years—were wholly 
unaware of the new standard.151 
 
147 A judge who is a former member of the Committee says: “Another important interest is that of 
stability. If the rules are constantly changing, the players—parties, lawyers and judges—cannot possibly 
keep track of the ‘rules of the game.’” Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the 
Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 219 (2010) (footnote omitted). In the wake of a flurry of changes to 
the Appellate Rules, Professor Wright admitted: “I found it very hard to know what rule was then in 
effect, or what rule was likely to be in effect in July when my book would be in print.” Wright, supra 
note 6, at 9. If Charles Alan Wright had trouble, what hope is there for the rest of us? 
148 Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 155 (2006). 
149 See Marcus, supra note 3, at 307–08 (discussing the context of the amendment regarding the 
scope of discovery). 
150 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1994) (amended 2000), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
151 In the fourth edition of our civil procedure casebook (which had a shelf life of two years 
because of the restyling of every Rule in 2007), Wendy Perdue and I included an opinion from the 
Northern District of Illinois ruling on a motion to compel responses to discovery. The judge applied the 
old standard, “relevant to the subject matter of the action.” Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3774, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2001) (internal quotation mark omitted). The next case in 
the book was the same judge’s opinion two months later, in which he admitted that he was not aware 
that the standard for discoverability had changed seven months before. Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 
2021, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7538, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2001) (“[T]his Court erred by applying old 
Rule 26(b)(1) instead of amended Rule 26(b)(1).”). He then undertook to apply the new standard. And 
though the motion came out the same way, the issue had to be briefed, argued, and decided. And 
litigants had to pay for all that. 
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Because the change to Rule 26(b)(1) was instituted in response to 
concern over the broad scope of discovery, a reasonable observer would 
assume that the amendment narrowed that scope. After years of litigation, 
however, it became clear that the new standard did not affect practice in 
any meaningful way.152 One commentator, reacting to the bar’s worry about 
the perceived constriction of discovery, concluded, “Frankly, it was not a 
big deal . . . .”153 
The experience with Rule 26(b)(1) points out two ways in which the 
Committee seems to be out of touch. First, why would it promulgate a 
change in language that was not intended to work a change in operation? 
Do we want a Committee that is bent on making changes that are not “big 
deal[s]”? Stated another way, if a rule amendment is not a big deal, why 
should it be made? I am not saying that every change to the Rules must be 
epochal. But why bother making a change that does nothing? 
Second, the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) was indeed a big deal 
because (busy) real-world lawyers and (busy) real-world judges had to 
litigate and determine its meaning. And real-world parties had to pay for 
that litigation. As it turns out, every motion to compel that questioned the 
scope of the new rule was a waste of human capital and money. At the end 
of the day, no change was wrought. The profession would have been better 
off if the Committee had done nothing. 
In contrast to the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1)—which may have been 
intended to result in change but in application did not—the past two 
decades have seen something new: amendments in which the Committee 
aspires to nothing more than wordsmithing. In 1991, the Committee 
amended Rule 50(a) to jettison “directed verdict” in favor of the hardly 
mellifluous “motion for judgment as a matter of law.”154 Judges and 
lawyers had been using “directed verdict” for centuries. There was no 
confusion in the profession about what the phrase meant or how the motion 
worked. The Committee felt, however, that the new phrase more accurately 
describes what a judge actually does when she grants such a motion. 
This wholly stylistic change imposed costs of which the Committee 
seems unaware.155 As a minor example, form files using “directed verdict” 
were rendered obsolete. More importantly, lawyers now were expected to 
use different terminology for the same motion in federal and state court. 
These may be small costs, but does the imposition of the Committee’s 
stylistic ideal justify imposing them? 
 
152 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of 
Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 24–27 (2001). 
153 Marcus, supra note 3, at 307. 
154 At the same time, the familiar “motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict” in Rule 50(b) 
was changed to the “renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.” 
155 See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 
231 (1998) (noting a disconnect between judges, who dominate rulemaking, and practicing lawyers). 
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The absurdity of the exercise is demonstrated by the fact that now—
over twenty years later—lawyers and judges still routinely use the phrase 
“directed verdict.”156 As a leading treatise says, “[T]he old term is so 
convenient, and appears so often in the cases and the literature, that it is 
still used here.”157 So what possible profit was there in the exercise? 
The experience with Rule 50 suggests that the Committee learned 
nothing from its 1966 amendment of Rule 19, which addresses the joinder 
of what lawyers have always called “necessary” parties. Concerned that the 
term “necessary” had become talismanic, the Committee deleted it from 
Rule 19 when it established its functional analysis in 1966.158 But it 
substituted the cumbersome phrase “needed for just adjudication.” Not 
surprisingly, everyone continued to say “necessary.” Over four decades 
later, the Committee replaced “needed for just adjudication” with 
“required.” Predictably, though, everybody still says “necessary.” In the 
final analysis, the change of terminology accomplished nothing. 
The Committee structure probably contributes to hyperactivity. Any 
standing committee is probably under pressure to justify its existence. The 
problem is especially acute when members serve limited terms. No one 
wants to say, “I served on the Committee and during my years it sent forth 
no amended rules.” But the Committee does not exist for members’ 
professional gratification. It exists to serve the profession. Every 
amendment, no matter how small, imposes costs. Judges and lawyers must 
study each new version of a rule. This takes time and effort. The burden 
should not be imposed too often or for trivialities. 
Moreover, all change runs the risk of unintended consequence and 
error. When it tinkered with Rule 50 to adopt its stylistic preference, the 
Committee inadvertently removed the provision that allowed plaintiffs to 
make the motion and also omitted any reference to a motion for partial 
judgment.159 This led to two years of uncertainty about the scope of the new 
rule before another amendment fixed the problems.160 This unnecessary 
 
156 See, e.g., Gregg v. Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”). 
157 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94, at 671 (7th ed. 
2011). 
158 The amendments to Rule 19 were part of a systematic overhaul of that provision and Rule 23, 
concerning class actions, and Rule 24, concerning intervention. There is considerable overlap among 
those Rules, as each addresses the potential harm to the interest of an absentee who is not joined in a 
pending case. In reaction to what had become a “jurisprudence of labels,” id. § 70, at 495, the 1966 
amendments set forth pragmatic factors justifying the overruling of plaintiff’s party structure of a case, 
see generally Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal 
Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–88 (1985). As a small part of these changes, the Committee 
deleted “necessary” from Rule 19(a). 
159 See Michael J. Waggoner, New Rule 50 May End Directed Verdicts for Plaintiffs, 22 SW. U. L. 
REV. 389, 389–90 (1993). 
160 See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 157, § 94, at 671 n.7 (collecting cases and scholarly 
authority). 
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thrashing was necessitated by the Committee’s original attempt to fix a 
problem that did not exist. 
The archetype of stylistic tinkering is the restyling project, which went 
into effect in 2007. This massive effort, involving thousands of person 
hours, amended every Federal Rule and the subnumbering of most. The 
goal was to make the Rules more readily understood. I favor most efforts at 
plain language. They make sense, for instance, with jury instructions, 
which must be divined by lay people. But lay people do not use the Federal 
Rules. Professionals use them and invest a great deal of time and effort to 
understand them. Along the way, they become facile with the provisions’ 
terminology and numbering.161 
As a result of the restyling, lawyers and judges accustomed to certain 
language and subsection numbers and letters were required to consult the 
new provisions to see the new language and the new subsectioning. Every 
form file in every law firm for every motion in federal court was rendered 
obsolete. And the restyling ensured that every federal rule would be 
worded differently from its corresponding state rule. 
Every page dealing with the language of every rule in treatises such as 
Moore’s Federal Practice and Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and 
Procedure had to be changed. The authors of every civil procedure 
casebook and hornbook had to publish new editions to track the new 
language. Real-world people—lawyers, law students, and clients—had to 
pay for those new books. And the cost in human capital is remarkable. 
Countless people spent countless hours changing references from Rule 
19(a)(2)(i) to Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), making sure that discussions of 
compulsory counterclaims cited Rule 13(a)(1) instead of Rule 13(a), and 
the like. Hardly rewarding or productive labor. 
Consider too the impact on legal research. For instance, the restyling 
changed “cross-claim” with a hyphen to “crossclaim” without a hyphen.162 
An electronic search for the phrase with the hyphen will not pick up cases 
using the phrase without the hyphen, and vice versa.163 So lawyers 
searching the case law must know that the phrase was previously 
hyphenated and run searches to account for that. Those seeking cases about 
joinder of proper plaintiffs will need to know that what today is Rule 
20(a)(1) was until 2007 simply Rule 20(a). Someone in the real world must 
pay for all those searches. 
 
161 Defenders of the Rules as restyled in 2007 invariably argue that the new product reads much 
more clearly than the old. That would carry more force if every lawyer and judge in practice when the 
new Rules went into effect had retired the day before. But they didn’t and so must relearn new language 
for what they have already learned. 
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g). 
163 For example, on November 2, 2012, a Lexis search of the federal courts library for “cross-claim 
and date (is 2012)” yielded 931 cases, while a search for “crossclaim and date (is 2012)” yielded 417 
cases. 
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These burdens are all the more astounding when we remember that the 
purpose of restyling was to “clarify, simplify, and modernize their 
expression without changing their substantive meaning.” The restyling 
project, like the amendment to rid us of the phrase “directed verdict,” is 
part of a new phenomenon: changes to procedural rules that do not change 
procedure.164 So all this effort and expense was incurred notwithstanding 
that the outcome of every motion in the federal courts should be unaffected. 
Of course, there is something unreal about saying that. It is hard to 
imagine that the legal profession, based as it is upon language, will simply 
accept without question that massive linguistic changes are to have no 
meaning. So it will come as no surprise that the restyled Rules will create 
litigation and uncertainty. 
Meaningless change and imposition of burden continue. Rule 56, as 
we discussed, remained unchanged even in the wake of the Court’s trilogy 
of summary judgment cases in 1986.165 But that Rule has proven less hardy 
recently. In 2007, it got its facelift in the restyling project. Part of that effort 
changed the language that the court “shall” grant a motion under certain 
circumstances to language that the court “should” grant the motion. In 
2009, the Committee changed “should” back to “shall.” In 2010, it 
amended the Rule again to change timing. Through its three amendments in 
four years, the standard for granting the motion bounced from the third 
sentence of Rule 56(c) to the second sentence of Rule 56(a). Even the 
Committee seemed embarrassed by this level of tinkering.166 Of course, it 
was not so embarrassed that it could restrain itself. 
CONCLUSION 
For at least a generation, commentary on federal judicial rulemaking 
has been gloomy. The process, like the wayward Hollywood star, has 
inspired words like “crisis” and “malaise” and “decline.” Some of the 
problem is inevitable. At the macro level, the REA raises profound issues 
of separation of powers, as Professor Redish has written compellingly. 
Even at the micro level, structural components ensure difficulties: the 
Committee is subject to lobbying, and Congress may always look over the 
Committee’s shoulder when a constituency convinces it to. Moreover, the 
Court occasionally sends the Committee a clear message. Usually, 
however, it does not, and the Committee must decide whether a particular 
area is better suited to rulemaking or to case development. 
 
164 See Hartnett, supra note 148, at 156 (arguing that restyled Rules “do not seek to create a better 
procedure”). 
165 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
166 “There are constant complaints that the rules are changed too often. Acting one year later to 
retract amendments the bar has barely had time to master will add support for these complaints.” Civil 
Rules Advisory Comm., Draft Minutes 5 ll. 206–208 (Apr. 20–21, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2009.pdf. 
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But the Committee is to blame for much of the troubled state. A group 
capable of leadership on significant issues has too often failed to lead. It 
has contented itself to splash in the shallow water and, through its 
hyperactivity, risks becoming more of a bother than a meaningful force. No 
one cares what the Committee’s stylistic preferences are. They do not 
matter, and the Committee should not force busy people to do a lot of busy 
work to accommodate them. A Committee that focuses on pedantry sends 
the message that pedantry is its highest calling. 
Like the wayward star, the Committee can change. Part of this process 
is an appreciation that every amendment to a Rule imposes costs and 
burdens on very busy people. This should lead to a reduction in the number 
of amendments promulgated. And this should lead to a focus on things that 
matter. If the effort put into changing “shall” to “must” and “Rule 13(a)” to 
“Rule 13(a)(1)” and deleting “indispensable” had been spent on something 
that would improve the administration of justice, the gloom would 
dissipate. We might be reading articles about rulemaking that featured 
“triumph” instead of “crisis.” 
Again, not every amendment will be transformative. There are 
technical things to be fixed from time to time. But every amendment should 
be calibrated to accomplish something for judges, lawyers, and litigants 
that justifies the cost and burden it imposes on them. 
Amendments to the Federal Rules should be like faculty meetings: rare 
and purposeful. 
 
